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Challenging the Law on Sexual History Evidence: 
a response to Dent and Paul 
 
Clare McGlynn* 
Professor of Law, Durham Law School, Durham University  
 
In an earlier edition of this journal, and in the aftermath of the controversial R v Ched Evans case, 
Nick Dent and Sandra Paul set forth a ‘defence’ of the current law on the use of sexual history 
evidence in sexual offence trials in England & Wales. They rejected arguments put forward by 
politicians and policy-makers - characterised as ‘emotive rhetoric and misconceived hyperbole’ - 
that the ruling opens the ‘floodgates’ to allowing sexual history evidence into trials, that the 
admission of sexual history evidence may perpetuate ‘victim-blaming’ and that allowing sexual 
history evidence may deter complainants reporting sexual offending. This article responds to Dent 
and Paul by challenging the current interpretation of the law and arguing that significant reform is 
urgently needed. It is written with the aim of encouraging a full debate, with all available evidence 
being considered, as well as differing approaches and perspectives being brought into the 
discussion.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In an earlier edition of this journal, Nick Dent and Sandra Paul set forth a ‘defence’ of the current 
law on the use of sexual history evidence in sexual offence trials in England & Wales.1 Their 
impetus was the media furore that greeted the acquittal of the footballer Ched Evans on charges of 
rape, and subsequent Parliamentary attempts to reform the law. Evans had been convicted of rape, 
but was acquitted following a retrial where new evidence of the complainant’s sexual behaviour 
with third parties had been admitted. The retrial was held after the Court of Appeal in R v Ched 
Evans had ruled that the sexual history evidence that came to light after the conviction ‘would have 
been relevant and admissible evidence at trial’.2  
Dent and Paul first set out their understanding of the current law, suggesting it provides a 
suitable ‘balancing act’3 between a defendant’s right to a fair trial and the need to prohibit irrelevant 
questioning of the complainant. This is followed by a rejection of what the authors identify as the 
main criticisms of the current legislative regime, namely: the argument that the judgment in R v 
Ched Evans opens the ‘floodgates’ to allowing sexual history evidence into trials; that the 
admission of sexual history evidence may perpetuate ‘victim-blaming’; and that allowing sexual 
history evidence may act as a deterrent to complainants reporting sexual offending. The authors’ 
aim overall is to challenge what they characterise as the ‘emotive rhetoric and misconceived 
hyperbole’4 in the current debate. Further, they are concerned that the views of ‘commentators who 
either misunderstand or willingly misrepresent’ the current law will influence the Government and 
Parliament when it comes to questions of reform.5  
                                                          
*
  Many thanks to Roger Masterman for his valuable insights on an earlier version of this article.  
 
1
  Nick Dent and Sandra Paul, ‘In defence of section 41’ (2017) 8 Criminal Law Review 613-627.  
2
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [72]. 
3
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 613 
4
  Ibid. 
5
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 627. 
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The aim of this article is to respond to the specific arguments put forward by Dent and Paul.6 
Accordingly, it adopts the same structure and is written in the spirit of encouraging a full debate, 
with as much of the available evidence being considered, as well as differing approaches and 
perspectives being brought into the discussion.  
 
Setting the Scene: Section 41 and R v Ched Evans  
 
Before going on to respond to the specifics of Dent and Paul’s article, this section briefly sets out 
the current law, with a specific focus on the issue central to the Evans case, namely admitting 
sexual history evidence with people other than the accused (third parties) on the grounds of 
‘similarity’. The current law is to be found in sections 41-43 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act which was introduced following sustained critique of the extensive and inappropriate 
use of sexual history evidence in sexual offence trials.7 Section 41(1) provides that except with 
leave of the court, no evidence may be adduced at trial, and no question may be asked in cross-
examination, by or on behalf of the defendant about any ‘sexual behaviour’ of the complainant. 
Section 41, therefore, applies both to evidence relating to sexual activity with the accused and with 
third parties. Leave may only be given if the evidence falls within one of the four exceptions, relates 
to ‘specific instances’ of sexual behaviour (sec 41(6)) and satisfies two further criteria, namely: a 
refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the court or jury (section 
41(2)(b)) and the purpose or main purpose is not to impugn the credibility of the complainant (sec 
41(4)).  
The first exception is where the issue to be proven is ‘not an issue of consent’ (section 
41(3)(a)) which includes evidence to support a defence of reasonable belief in consent, motive to 
lie, as well as being used to admit evidence relating to alleged previous ‘false’ complaints. The 
other exceptions apply where the issue is consent. The second exception is where the evidence 
relates to sexual behaviour at or about the same time as the sexual activity in question (section 
41(3)(b)). Evidence of sexual behaviour ‘so similar’ that the ‘similarity cannot reasonably be 
explained as a coincidence’ is the third exception (section 41(3(c)) and evidence is permitted under 
section 41(5) where it is necessary to rebut prosecution claims.  
It is the scope of the similarity exception that was at issue in Evans. This exception was not 
included in the initial legislative drafts of the 1999 Act: it only being added following a successful 
intervention in the House of Lords legislative debates. It was argued that evidence should be 
permitted in situations such as where a complainant had previously engaged in a ‘Romeo and Juliet 
fantasy’, namely a desire to have sex with men after they have climbed into the bedroom from a 
balcony.8 The argument was that such evidence would show some form of pattern of sexual acts of 
this peculiar nature and this might have a bearing on issues at trial.  
The Government accepted the amendment, making clear its view that to be admitted, the 
behaviour at issue must be ‘so unusual that it would be wholly unreasonable to explain it as 
coincidental’.9 The requirement that activity is ‘unusual’ makes sense in that it enables a pattern to 
be identified and, if the conduct is unusual, it is less likely to be a coincidence. Such an approach 
also chimes with that taken in other jurisdictions such as North Carolina in the US which only 
permits evidence of ‘a pattern of sexual behaviour so distinctive and so closely resembling’ earlier 
conduct’.10 This requires establishing a pattern, and so a number of acts, but also a pattern of 
                                                          
6
  For a more detailed examination of the current law and suggestions for reform, see Clare McGlynn, ‘Rape 
Trials and Sexual History Evidence: Reforming the Law on Third Parties’ (2017) 81 Journal of Criminal Law 367-392.  
7
  For a discussion, see Jennifer Temkin, ‘Sexual history evidence – beware the backlash’ [2003] Crim LR 217 
and Vera Baird, ‘Changes to Section 2 of Sexual Offences Act 1976’ (1999) 39 Medicine, Science and the Law 198.  
8
  Hansard vol 597(2) February 1999, col 45. 
9
  Hansard, 23 March 1999, col 1218.  
10
  As discussed in Elizabeth Kessler, ‘Pattern of Sexual Conduct Evidence and Present Consent: limiting the 
admissibility of sexual history evidence in rape prosecutions’ (1992) 14 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 79, at 82. 
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unusual behaviour. The justification is that unless the behaviour is unusual, it is more difficult to 
establish that there is indeed a pattern, and to ensure that ordinary, everyday activities are not 
included. However, while the Government’s intention was to focus on unusual conduct, and ensure 
a narrow interpretation of the exception, the practice of the law has proven different, as exemplified 
in Evans. 
Key to understanding the current law is Lord Clyde’s comment in R v A when he stated that 
the similarity exception ‘does not necessitate that the similarity has to be in some rare or bizarre 
conduct’.11 However, the context to Lord Clyde’s opinion is crucial. He was seeking to find a way 
to bring within section 41, sexual behaviour evidence between a complainant and defendant and to 
do so he gave an expansive interpretation of the ‘similarity’ exception. Thus, his focus was on 
sexual history evidence with the accused (not third parties), as he made clear when stating that 
admitting third party evidence ‘is not the question in the present appeal’.12  
Nonetheless, Lord Clyde’s words have been cited in subsequent cases involving third 
parties. The Court of Appeal in Evans said that Lord Clyde’s words provided ‘helpful guidance’ and 
ruled that to come within the similarity exception, the behaviour in question does not have to be 
‘unusual or bizarre’. 13 Examining the particular facts, the Court of Appeal determined that the 
evidence that two men had had sex with the complainant, one before and one after the alleged rape, 
was ‘arguably sufficiently similar’ to come within section 41(3)(c)(i).14 Further, had the evidence 
been available at the original trial, it would have been ‘relevant and admissible’.15  The Court 
identified the ‘similar’ elements as being: (a) the complaint ‘had been drinking’; (b) she ‘instigated 
certain sexual activity’; (c) she ‘directed her sexual partner into certain positions’; and (d) ‘used 
specific words of encouragement’.16 Specifically, the sexual intercourse included the ‘doggy style’ 
sexual position and she allegedly used the phrase ‘f..k me harder’ with one man and ‘harder’ with 
another. The Crown argued that there are good grounds for suggesting that this behaviour is 
commonplace activity that could easily be explained as a coincidence.17 However, the Court ruled 
that the test does not require unusual or bizarre conduct, so the everyday can constitute sufficiently 
similar behaviour for these purposes. The Court of Appeal did conclude by acknowledging that the 
circumstances in which evidence of sexual behaviour with third parties is admitted should be rare, 
but it maintained that R v Evans is a ‘rare case’, as discussed further below.18 
 
Floodgates and the impact of R v Ched Evans  
 
Floodgates 
 
Dent and Paul first examine comments made by Vera Baird QC, and members of the Women’s 
Parliamentary Labour Party, that the Evans case may lead to more questioning of complainants 
regarding their sexual history than has previously been the case – the ‘floodgates’ argument. The 
authors respond that a floodgates argument ‘fails to recognise that the threshold for admitting 
evidence under section 41(3)(c)(i) is a high one which will rarely be satisfied’.19  
                                                          
11
  [2001] UKHL 25 at [135].  
12
  [2001] UKHL 25 at [131].  
13
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [51] and [73]. 
14
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [72]. 
15
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [72]. For a detailed discussion, see McGlynn above n 6. 
16
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [71]. 
17
  For a discussion of the commonplace nature of both the sexual position at issue and language used, see 
McGlynn n 6.  
18
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [74]. 
19
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 621. The authors also challenge the reference by Baird and the Women’s 
Parliamentary Labour Party to Evans setting a ‘precedent’. While it seems unnecessary to engage further in a technical 
debate about the legal or other meaning of the term, the authors do claim that it is ‘difficult to comprehend’ how the 
Court of Appeal’s ruling can set a legal precedent ‘when the judgment was confined to the specific facts of the case’ (at 
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It would be encouraging if the threshold was high and rarely satisfied. Unfortunately, 
however, it is difficult to make such a definitive claim. Dent and Paul are right to the extent that 
there are many cases in which it is claimed that the threshold is high, and the Court of Appeal in 
Evans referred to the ‘hurdle’ facing a defendant seeking to admit this form of evidence.20 And 
there are cases where courts have met defence submissions to admit evidence with a robust 
rejection.21 However, it is also possible to bring into the discussion other cases where the threshold 
does not appear to be so ‘high’.  
R v Mukadi is one such case.22 Upholding an appeal against a rape conviction, the Court of 
Appeal ruled that evidence of the complainant getting into a car and exchanging phone numbers 
with a man other than the accused, earlier on the day of the alleged rape, should have been 
admitted. The trial judge had excluded the evidence, suggesting it was ‘potentially character 
blackening’ and stating that ‘this kind of evidence is exactly that which the statute is designed to 
exclude’.23  But the Court of Appeal disagreed. Another example is the equivocal case of R v 
Hamadi. 24  While the Court of Appeal upheld a refusal to admit general evidence of the 
complainant’s supposedly ‘promiscuous nature’, evidence was permitted at trial of the complainant 
having sex with a third party when she had ‘asked him to tie her to a bed’ (the rape allegation 
involved being tied), as well as evidence that earlier in the evening in a bar she had jumped into the 
arms of a male friend ‘simulating sexual movements’.25 The admission of this evidence was not 
subject to an appeal, yet it is difficult to see how this third party evidence can be relevant to whether 
or not the complainant consented to an entirely different man later in the evening.  
Dent and Paul go on to cite R v Guthrie26 as a case that ‘helps demonstrate that Courts do 
not simply admit evidence under section 41 without careful scrutiny’.27 In this case, decided after 
Evans, the Court of Appeal refused an application to admit previous sexual history alleged to have 
taken place about a year before the alleged rape and between the accused and complainant. It is 
welcome that the Court rejected the application in this case on the basis that the events were too 
remote to be of sufficient relevance. However, the judgment relates to evidence between the 
accused and complainant, and therefore stands on a different footing to third party evidence in terms 
of relevance. Therefore, while the temporal limit does provide some solace to those concerned 
about investigations into their sexual history, it is of far less help on the specific question of what 
sort of sexual behaviour will be deemed to have a ‘relevant similarity’.28  
The authors also suggest that R v Guthrie demonstrates that the floodgates ‘have not and 
will not be opened’.29 Aside from the fact that the case is not focussed on sexual history with third 
parties, in any event, one case cannot justify such a claim. We will have to wait to see the 
cumulative effect of not just a number of future appeal court judgments, but also evidence of the 
practice on the ground. It seems that the only case on which there appears to be general agreement 
is R v T (Abdul), described by the Court of Appeal as an ‘easy’ case, involving previous consensual 
sex between the complainant and defendant in a children’s climbing frame in a park (where the 
alleged rape was said to have taken place).30 The irony is that this factual scenario is surely one to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
621). However, the authors’ argument is not clear, as the Court makes a number of pertinent rulings on this area of law, 
as discussed below, which will no doubt be relied on in subsequent cases by defendants seeking to introduce sexual 
history evidence. 
20
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [72].  
21
  For example, defence counsel’s application in R v Barrington White to admit evidence of prostitution as not 
being an ‘issue of consent’ was rejected by the Court of Appeal as ‘untenable’: [2004] EWCA Crim 946 at [23]. 
22
  R v Mukadi [2003] EWCA Crim 3765. 
23
  Ibid at [15]. 
24
  R v Hamadi [2007] EWCA Crim 3048. 
25
  R v Hamadi [2007] EWCA Crim 3048 at [25]. 
26
  R v Guthrie [2016] EWCA Crim 1633. 
27
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 621. 
28
  As described in R v Guthrie [2016] EWCA Crim 1633 at [10]. 
29
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 622. 
30
  The Court of Appeal in R v Harris ([19]) describing R v T (Abdul) [2004] 2 Cr App Rep 552. 
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be described as a bizarre and unusual; hence it being ‘easy’ to establish sufficient similarity and 
substantial relevance. 
As well as claiming that the threshold to admit evidence is high, Dent and Paul argue that it 
will rarely be satisfied. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that this is the case. As the authors 
themselves suggest, there is a need for up to date information on the use of sexual history evidence 
in trials. Nonetheless, from the evidence that we do have, it seems that sexual history evidence is 
adduced in around one third of trials, perhaps more (especially as material often appears to be 
introduced in circumvention of the procedural rules), with a high success rate for applications.31 
There is no currently available evidence, therefore, to substantiate Government claims that the use 
of these forms of evidence is ‘exceptional’; nor claims that it is ‘rarely’ used.32 
 
Impact on future defence strategies  
 
The authors’ next reject the argument made by Labour MP Jess Phillips that, following Evans, a 
defendant may be encouraged to engage in ‘crowd-sourcing information from a victim’s previous 
partners and using it against her in court’. 33  The authors suggest this constitutes an ‘implicit 
suggestion’ that defendants will collude with others and fabricate an account.34 It is possible to read 
this into the comment. However, there is no requirement of collusion for this argument to be worth 
raising. Phillips may in fact be noting that as bizarre behaviour is not required, and that 
commonplace sexual activities from just two partners can be taken to satisfy the similarity test, then 
a defendant has little to lose in seeking information from a complainants’ previous sexual partners. 
Fabrication is not necessary: it may simply involve seeking out evidence that may be useful. Where 
conduct need not be unusual or bizarre, there is perhaps a greater likelihood that such ‘similarities’ 
may be found, and therefore a greater incentive to seek out such material. That this is a potential 
impact of Evans is perhaps not as far-fetched as the authors imply. Indeed, this very argument was 
raised in the Court of Appeal where Eleanor Laws QC for the Crown warned against admission of 
the evidence on the basis that the ‘court should not encourage this kind of post-trial investigation 
into the sexual behaviours of a complainant that has the potential for undermining the clear intent of 
Parliament in enacting section 41’.35  
 
Victim-blaming, credibility and sexual history to prove consent  
 
Next, Dent and Paul turn their attention to another criticism of section 41, namely that ‘the 
admission of sexual behaviour evidence amounts to “victim-blaming” and that the admission of this 
evidence risks giving credence to the “twin myths”’.36 They quote again from Vera Baird QC: ‘a 
rape defendant could bring Mr B and Mr C to testify that the complainant had had consensual sex 
with them. The argument would run, she consented to me as well because she’ll have sex with 
anyone. The two arguments – she’s a tart and you can’t believe a word she says – were what 
women, not surprisingly, feared. These were the “twin myths” that flowed from the use of previous 
                                                          
31
  The available evidence is discussed in McGlynn above n 6. See also Temkin et al who found that sexual 
history evidence with third parties was introduced in half (4 out of 8) of observed trials without any application under 
section 41: ‘Different Functions of Rape Myth Use in Courts’ (2016) Feminist Criminology 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1557085116661627 
32
  Secretary of State for Justice, Liz Truss, ‘A Speech on criminal justice reform by the Secretary of State for 
Justice’, 13 February 2017, available https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-speech-on-criminal-justice-reform-
by-the-secretary-of-state-for-justice [accessed 29 September 2017]. 
33
  Jess Phillips, ‘Dredging up sexual history in court will deter rape victims – this must end now’ The Guardian, 
24 October 2016. 
34
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 621. 
35
  R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452 at [64]. 
36
  Dent and Paul above n 1 a 623. 
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sexual history.’37 Further, they quote the Women’s Parliamentary Labour Party who wrote that they 
did not want to see a ‘return to a culture of victim-blaming’ and that ‘the use of a complainant’s 
sexual history should never be used in our courts as evidence of consent’.38 The authors’ respond by 
stating that these arguments demonstrate a ‘fundamental misunderstanding of the way the 
legislation works’.39  
 
Victim-blaming and challenging credibility  
 
Dent and Paul state that in Evans the sexual history evidence was introduced not to challenge the 
complainant’s credibility, but as being relevant to the issue of consent, belief in consent and to 
bolster the defendant’s credibility. That is, it was not submitted to bolster one of the ‘twin myths’. 
This is technically true: the defence were not claiming that the complainant was lying about consent 
because, in fact, she could not remember the events of the evening and she did not, therefore, give 
evidence of non-consent. Such a scenario is not common at trial and required the defence to rebut 
the inference of incapacity; differentiating it from the ‘norm’ where there is a direct clash of 
evidence on consent. This is one aspect of the case that made it unusual in the eyes of the Court of 
Appeal and meant there was no direct attempt to challenge the credibility (truthfulness) of the 
complainant. It is difficult to know what the outcome would have been to an application to admit 
the evidence had the complainant herself given evidence that she did not consent. 
Nonetheless, it is important here to note the broader impact of introducing sexual history 
evidence. In practice, the admission of evidence relating to the complainant’s sexual past, including 
evidence of casual sex, excessive drinking and other salacious details of her lifestyle, is more than 
likely to have challenged her ‘moral credibility’. Thus, while it is rarely suggested nowadays that 
sexually active women are less truthful, the focus of attention has shifted from such ‘probative 
credibility’ (ie truthfulness) to ‘moral credibility’. 40  Challenging the moral credibility of a 
complainant by introducing sexual history evidence invites the (often implicit) determination that 
the complainant either does not deserve the court’s sympathy or that there is not a suitable 
foundation for punishing the accused.41 Often more nebulous evidence about ‘sexual character’ 
bolsters this effect, including references to women’s lifestyles, personal habits, dress and such 
like.42  
A range of studies across different jurisdictions have identified potentially distorting impacts 
of sexual history evidence, specifically that sexual history evidence makes acquittals more likely as 
jurors (and ‘mock’ jurors) consider complainants less credible and more likely to have consented.43 
It seems that juries often focus on the ‘respectability’ of women complainants, with evidence of 
                                                          
37
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 623, quoting Vera Baird, ‘We cannot allow courts to judge rape by sexual history’ 
17 October 2016, The Guardian  https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/17/courts-judge-rape-sexual-
history-ched-evans-case [accessed 25 September 2017]. It should be noted that the quote from Baird given by the 
authors was not related to a claim that the evidence was used in Evans to challenge the complainant’s credibility. The 
selected quote was discussing the reasons behind the introduction of section 41 in 1999. 
38
  Letter to Attorney General from Women Labour MPs, LabourList, 24 October 2016, available at: 
https://labourlist.org/2016/10/womens-plp-demands-rape-case-reform-after-ched-evans-retrial/ [accessed 25 September 
2017] quoted by Dent and Paul above n 1 at 623.  
39
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 623. 
40
  See Aileen McColgan, ‘Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence’ (1996) 16 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 275 and Michele Burman, ‘Evidencing sexual assault: women in the witness box’ (2009) 56 
Probation Journal 379.  
41
  McColgan, ibid at 281.  
42
  As discussed in Burman above n 40. 
43
  See, for example: Liz Kelly et al, Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history evidence 
in rape trials (London: Home Office Report 20/06, 2006); B Brown et al, Sexual History and Sexual Character 
Evidence in Scottish Sexual Offence Trials (Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1992); Regina Schuller 
and Patricia Hastings, ‘Complainant sexual history evidence: its impact on mock juror decisions’ (2002) 26 Psychology 
of Women Quarterly 252. 
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previous sexual activity, alongside drinking, drugs or other ‘risk-taking’ activities, reducing their 
‘respectability’ which, in turn, reduces the assessment of credibility.44 For example, in relation to 
drunkenness (one of the grounds of ‘similarity’ in Evans), research with mock jurors suggests a 
shifting of responsibility away from defendants and onto complainants where the complainants have 
been drinking.45  
This idea of ‘moral credibility’, and influence of sexual character evidence, helps to explain 
why despite decades of the commonly stated position that sexually active women are not less 
worthy of belief, the defence may find value in introducing sexual history evidence. It seems that 
knowledge of a woman’s sexual activities contributes to shifting the focus of the trial from the 
defendant’s actions to those of the complainant, thereby also shifting legal and moral blame and 
responsibility from the defendant to the complainant.46 Indeed, the father of the complainant in 
Evans said of his daughter’s experience that ‘it was like she was the one on trial’.47  
Therefore, and returning to Dent and Paul’s argument, while it is the case that evidence 
about the complainant in Evans was not introduced to explicitly and directly challenge the 
complainant’s credibility, in practice there is a good chance that such evidence impacted on the trial 
process in ways which reflected negatively on the complainant and influenced decision-making. 
This exemplifies the challenge for the justice system in terms of balancing the need to permit 
relevant evidence, at the same time as reducing distorting impacts on the decision-making process 
by restricting highly prejudicial material.   
 
Using sexual history evidence to demonstrate consent 
 
Dent and Paul next challenge the Women’s Parliamentary Labour Party recommendation that 
sexual history evidence should never be permitted to demonstrate consent. The authors claim this 
indicates ‘a misunderstanding of the concept of consent in rape cases’.48 They point to the defence 
of reasonable belief in consent which requires a court to examine the beliefs of the defendant, 
taking into account ‘other pieces of objective evidence’, as required by section 1(2) of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 which states that whether a ‘belief is reasonable is to be determined having 
regard to all the circumstances’. They conclude that never permitting sexual history evidence to 
prove consent ‘is tantamount to viewing the offence of rape from the perspective of the complainant 
– and not from the perspective of the defendant which is what the jury is specifically required to 
do’.49 They continue that evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual behaviour will be ‘relevant 
                                                          
44
  It is not just juries which appear to be influenced. For example, in a study into attrition in rape cases, Katrin 
Hold and Elisabeth Stanko found that: ‘As far as police decisions are concerned (but not the victim decision to 
withdraw), the intractable ‘respectable woman’ image is significant: voluntary alcohol consumption prior to the rape, a 
history of consensual sex with the perpetrator, mental health problems and learning difficulties, and a woman’s 
‘misunderstanding’ of the meaning of consent explain police decisions to discontinue a case’: ‘Complaints of rape and 
the criminal justice system: Fresh evidence on the attrition problem in England and Wales’ (2015) 12(3) European 
Journal of Criminology 324–341 at 336. 
45
  Emily Finch and Vanessa Munro, ‘Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases Involving 
Intoxicants’ (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology 25. 
46
  The Evans case provides a recent example of the enduring nature of negative attitudes towards sexually active 
women, with social media replete with disparaging references to the complainant as a ‘slag’ and far worse: discussed in 
Holly Baxter, ‘Justice should never be done like it was in the Ched Evans rape trial’, 14 October 2016, The 
Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/ched-evans-footballer-rape-trial-acquitted-justice-woman-
misogyny-consent-prison-walk-free-a7362276.html [accessed 29 September 2017]. 
47
  Quoted in Sanchez Manning, ‘Father of Ched Evans's accuser slams lawyers for 'raping' his daughter by 
trawling through her private life’, 15 October 2016, Mail on Sunday, available 
at:  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3840045/They-said-daughter-asking-Father-Ched-Evans-s-accuser-slams-
defence-lawyers-raping-daughter-trawling-private-life.html [accessed 29 September 2017]. 
48
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 623. 
49
  Ibid. 
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to an objective assessment as to whether or not the defendant held a reasonable belief in consent – 
and Evans is a paradigm example of this’.50   
Addressing the more general point first, an argument that sexual history evidence should not 
be used to demonstrate consent is not a ‘misunderstanding’ of consent but simply a different 
approach to that of the authors. If consent is understood as person and situation specific, and cannot 
therefore be inferred from previous sexual history, then it makes sense to say that sexual history 
evidence should not be admissible to prove consent. Indeed, this is the position in Canadian law 
where sexual history evidence is not permitted to demonstrate consent, that being perceived as one 
of the ‘twin myths’ that the legislation is designed to challenge.51 Even though English law permits 
the use of sexual history evidence to demonstrate consent, doing so is far less accepted in relation to 
third party evidence.52 Indeed, Lord Clyde in R v A clearly stated that while some evidence of 
previous sexual behaviour with the defendant may be relevant to an issue of consent, he did not 
‘consider that evidence of her behaviour with other men should now be accepted as relevant for that 
purpose’.53   
Dent and Paul also raise the issue of using sexual history evidence to demonstrate a 
reasonable belief in consent. It is, however, difficult to see how the sexual history evidence in 
Evans could be used to support this particular defence, if it was (as Evans claimed) unknown to him 
at the time of the alleged rape. This is particularly so as one of the two sexual acts deemed to satisfy 
the similarity test occurred after the events at issue. Further, even had he known of the one example 
of the complainant’s sexual activity with another person, it is important to consider whether this is a 
suitable or sufficient basis for a reasonable belief in consent. If yes, this would mean that a 
defendant is permitted to form a reasonable belief in consent from his knowledge of one sexual act 
between the complainant and a different person that took place weeks prior to the alleged offence. It 
is clearly arguable that such an approach does not accord with the intention of the change to 
reasonable belief in consent introduced in the 2003 Sexual Offences Act. Interestingly, research into 
the operation of section 41 found ‘considerable criticism’ amongst barristers and judges regarding 
the belief in consent exception on the basis that it was ‘too wide and “illogical”’.54 
Dent and Paul next suggest that excluding sexual behaviour evidence ‘potentially infringes 
the right of a defendant to a fair trial’.55 In particular, they refer to the judgment of Lord Steyn in R 
v A who ruled that the interpretative obligation under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 
required section 41 to be ‘subject to the implied provision that evidence or questioning which is 
required to ensure a fair trial under article 6 of the Convention should not be treated as 
inadmissible’.56 This dicta has been the subject of extensive commentary, with differing views on 
its scope and implications, both in relation to human rights jurisprudence generally, and on the 
substantive issue of admission of sexual history evidence.57 In the latter context, Dent and Paul 
endorse a more expansive approach to interpreting Lord Steyn’s dicta, arguing that the ‘protection 
of complainants cannot be at a cost to the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial’.58  
                                                          
50
  Ibid at 624. 
51
  See further Elaine Craig, ‘Section 276 Misconstrued: The Failure to Properly Interpret and Apply Canada’s 
Rape Shield Provisions’ (2016) Canadian Bar Review 45. 
52
  Many US states exclude entirely sexual history evidence with third parties on the basis of its irrelevance. For a 
discussion, see Kessler above n 10 at 82. 
53
  [2001] UKHL 25 at [125]. 
54
  Kelly et al above n 43 at 59. Further, there was evidence that it had led to a change in defence practice, with 
belief in consent being put forward in more cases to enable the strategic admission of sexual history evidence. 
55
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 624. 
56
  [2001] UKHL 25 at [45]. 
57
  This should not come as a surprise: it is the essence of perennial debates over the nature and determination of 
precedent. See, for example, the discussion in Michael Zander, The Law Making Process (2004)  on the ‘flexibility’ of 
precedent and acknowledgement that judges can ‘manipulate’ precedents, logic, social policy and ‘all other bases of 
argument’ in determining what constitutes a precedent. This underscores the often ‘unacknowledged’ flexibility of the 
concept of precedent. 
58
  Dent and Paul above n 1 at 624. 
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However, it can alternatively be suggested, and this is the argument being made here, that R 
v A is better interpreted as confined to a narrower set of circumstances, specifically sexual history 
evidence between the accused and complainant. There is support for such an approach in the 
opinions of other Lords in R v A. Lord Hope specifically stated that it was not possible to read into 
section 41 ‘a new provision which would entitle the court to give leave whenever it was of the 
opinion that this was required to ensure a fair trial’.59 And while Lord Clyde was open to the 
possible need to admit evidence relating to sexual activity with the accused, he took a contrary view 
regarding evidence with third parties: ‘That evidence of sexual behaviour with other persons than 
the defendant should be so allowed seems questionable’.60  
Arguments in favour of a narrower interpretation also arise when examining R v A in the 
context of Human Rights Act jurisprudence. It is now commonly accepted that R v A represents a 
‘high water mark’ for the section 3 interpretative obligation, with such ‘activist’ uses of this power 
less evident in more recent decisions.61 Indeed, as Lord Bingham argued in Anderson, to attribute a 
meaning to a legislative provision quite different from that which Parliament intended … would go 
well beyond any interpretative process sanctioned by section 3 of the 1998 Act’.62 Avoiding such 
‘judicial vandalism’63 by favouring a narrow interpretation of the ratio of R v A, therefore, can be 
said to be preferable in that it more closely allows for the Parliamentary intent to restrict the use of 
sexual history evidence, while also accommodating fair trial concerns, particularly in an area of 
such public controversy. This is not to say that the defendant’s right to a fair trial is not to be given 
appropriate credence. But it is to say that the balance struck by Parliament, a necessary balancing 
exercise as recognized by the European Court of Human Rights64, does not necessarily require 
sexual history evidence with third parties to be admitted in these sorts of circumstances, due to its 
low probative value and highly prejudicial nature.65 
 
Sexual History Evidence as a Deterrent to Reporting 
 
The final criticism of the Evans judgment to which the authors respond again comes from the 
Women’s Parliamentary Labour Party which suggested that the case will ‘deter victims from 
disclosing their abuse and will reduce the number of victims presenting their cases to the police for 
fear of having their private lives investigated and scrutinised’.66 Dent and Paul respond that this 
‘assertion is not supported by evidence’. 67  Unfortunately, to support their own assertion that 
prosecutions and convictions for rape are at the highest levels recorded, the authors cite Crown 
Prosecution Services statistics which relate to 2015-2016.68 Such statistics, therefore, do not help us 
to decide whether or not Evans has or will make a difference to reporting and prosecutions.  
                                                          
59
  [2001] UKHL 25 at [109]. 
60
  [2001] UKHL 25 at [130]. 
61
  Roger Masterman and Colin Murray, Exploring Constitutional and Administrative Law (Pearson, 2013), pp 
628-631. See also Danny Nicol, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson’ [2004] Public Law 274. 
62
  R (on the application of Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837 at [30] 
63
  Ibid. 
64
  See, for example, Doorson v the Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330 where it was held that the ‘principles of a 
fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or 
victims called upon to testify’ [70]. 
65
  For acknowledgement that courts should give ‘great weight’ to decisions of the legislature as to how 
competing rights/interests are to be balanced, see: R (Animal Defenders International) [2008] UKHL 15 at [33]: ‘A 
general rule means that a line must be drawn, and it is for Parliament to decide where. The drawing of a line inevitably 
means that hard cases will arise falling on the wrong side of it, but that should not be held to invalidate the rule if, 
judged in the round, it is beneficial.’ 
66
  Quoted in Dent and Paul above n 1 a 625.  
67
  Ibid at 626. 
68
  Ibid at 626 quoting ‘CPS prosecuting and convicting more cases of rape, domestic abuse, sexual offences and 
child abuse than ever before’, 6 September 2016. Available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/vawg_report_2016/ [accessed 27 September 2017]. 
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It may be that Dent and Paul’s argument is, alternatively, that the current law, pre-Evans, 
has not affected reporting and, therefore, neither will Evans. However, there is no evidence to 
support such an argument. While numbers of reports to the police of rape and other sexual offences 
have been increasing, it does not follow that victims have not been deterred by current legal 
practice. The latest evidence from the Crime Survey of England & Wales found that the equivalent 
of 645,000 people were victims of sexual assaults in 2015-2016 and the Office for National 
Statistics reported that there were 106,098 police recorded sexual offences. 69  These figures 
demonstrate the gap between experiences of sexual offending and decisions to report to the police. 
While there are a multitude of reasons why women (and it is mostly women), do not report sexual 
offences to the police, it is clearly plausible that fear of their sexual history being scrutinised in 
court could well be a relevant one.  
Indeed, the research available suggests that the court process, including admission of sexual 
history evidence, does impact on complainants’ decision-making. The most comprehensive study 
available on section 41 found that complainants ‘did weigh the issue of sexual history evidence in 
their decisions to report and, later on, whether to withdraw’ and that ‘[p]olice officers, SARC staff 
and support agencies agreed that sexual history evidence plays a part in attrition, especially, but not 
exclusively, in the early stages’.70 This is why ‘fear of court’ has been identified as the most 
common reason for withdrawing support for a prosecution.71 Victim Support similarly report that 
from their experience, they ‘know that victims fear being questioned about their sexual history at 
court and that consequently it can be a barrier to reporting’.72 
This is a longstanding concern of both those engaged in supporting victims and members of 
the judiciary. It was Lord Slynn who, in R v A acknowledged that: ‘In recent years it has become 
plain that women who allege that they have been raped should not in court be harassed unfairly by 
questions about their previous sex experiences. To allow such harassment is very unjust to the 
woman; it is also bad for society in that women will be afraid to complain and as a result men who 
ought to be prosecuted will escape.’73 It is also why Canadian law provides that ‘society’s interest 
in encouraging the reporting of sexual assault offences’ is one of the grounds that a judge is 
required to take into account when determining applications to admit sexual history evidence.74 
Accordingly, it is plausible that the current law on sexual history evidence deters 
complainants from reporting sexual offending and it is, therefore, clearly possible that Evans risks 
making this worse. We are not able to make definitive claims, either way, on this issue. 
Nonetheless, while the evidence already demonstrates reluctance to report, together with reports of 
sexual history rules impacting on such decisions, it is worth reflecting on how the law can be 
reformed to ensure minimal deterrence and maximum focus on relevance. Dent and Paul worry that 
it is the media publicity surrounding the Evans acquittal that may itself deter complainants from 
reporting, rather than the operation of the current law. It is indeed possible that the public discussion 
is adversely impacting on complainants. However, the authors’ comment assumes that all had been 
well with the operation of the law and that it is the media surrounding the Evans case which is 
problematic. On the other hand, it can be suggested that it is the Evans case itself that is problematic 
and highlights a particular need to reform the laws relating to similarity and third party evidence. 
                                                          
69
  Office for National Statistics, Overview of violent crime and sexual offences (ONS: 9 February 2017), 
available 
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[accessed 27 September 2017]. 
70
  Kelly et al above n 43 at 69. 
71
  See Olivia Smith, ‘The practicalities of English and Welsh rape trials: observations and avenues for 
improvement’ (2017) Criminology and Criminal Justice doi:10.1177/1748895817702508 
72
  Victim Support, Policy Statement on Sexual Violence, 12 April 2017, available at: 
https://www.victimsupport.org.uk/more-us/policy-and-research/reports [accessed 29 September 2017].  
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Evans has shone a light on the legislative regime as a whole and ushered in a welcome public and 
political debate about the need to reform many aspects of the current regime. Indeed, a wholesale 
review, starting from first principles would be welcome.  
 
Conclusions  
 
This article has examined Dent and Paul’s defence of the current law on sexual history evidence, 
and their concerns about ‘commentators who either misunderstand or willingly misrepresent the 
current provisions’, by offering additional evidence, analysis and suggestions for reform, as well as 
challenging these serious allegations. The law on sexual history evidence is a highly controversial 
topic which gives rise to heated debate. It is also an extremely (and unnecessarily) complicated area 
of law. This unfortunate combination of controversy and complication provides a significant 
challenge for media reporting and political discussion. In such a context, it is important to open up 
debate and try to understand the perspectives of others and to learn from those with different 
professional and personal experiences. Indeed, it may be productive for us all to recognise in the 
debates to come that we mostly share the same aims: namely to ensure the effective administration 
of justice, to convict the guilty and to minimise the harm caused to complainants and witnesses in 
the process.  
 
